Cross-border bank insolvency / edited by Rosa M. Lastra.
Material type:
- 9780199577071
- 346.08215 LAS.C
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Symbiosis Law School, Noida REFERENCE CUPBOARD | Reference | 346.08215 LAS.C (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not For Loan | SLSN-B-9285 |
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346.072 BRI.I International Sale of Goods / | 346.077 JOH.S Set-off law and practice : an international handbook | 346.077 RAO.L Law relating to securitisation and reconsttruction of financial assets & enforcement of security interest | 346.08215 LAS.C Cross-border bank insolvency / | 346.08215 PRO.L Law and practice of international banking | 346.0865 JAC.L Liability insurance in international arbitration : | 346.092 International Law on Foreign Investment |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Machine generated contents note: 1.Bank Insolvency in the Context of Crisis Management
Introduction
Lender of Last Resort
Deposit Insurance
Deposit Insurance in the EU
Government Rescue Packages
Systemic Risk Considerations
2.Definition of Bank Insolvency and Types of Bank Insolvency Proceedings
What is Bank Insolvency?
Why Lex Specialist
Objectives and Purposes of a Bank Insolvency Framework
Types of Proceedings
The Roles of the Relevant Authorities in a Bank Insolvency Framework
The UK Banking Act 2009 and the Special Resolution Regime
Conclusions
3.Early Intervention
The Theoretical Basis for Early Intervention
Early Intervention in the UK
Early Intervention in the EU
PCA in the USA
4.The Actors in the Process: Of Supervisors, Regulators, Administrators, and Courts of Justice
Actors Generally
Difficulties in Resolving Banking Crises
Solutions and Responses
Contents note continued: Actors Generally: Conclusions
Courts
General Considerations
Domestic Banks
Foreign Banks
Courts: Conclusions
5.Allocating Costs of Failure Resolution: Shaping Incentives and Reducing Moral Hazard
Failure Resolution as a Cornerstone of a Financial System
Who Should Bear the Losses?
Loss Allocation Ladder
The Legal Protection of Shareholder and Creditor Rights
Protecting Systemic Functions and Allocating Losses
Cross-Border Aspects
Conclusion
6.Developments in the EU
Directive 2001/24/EC on the Reorganization and Winding-up of Credit Institutions
Consultation and Proposals for Reform
7.International Law Principles Applicable to Cross-Border Bank Insolvency
Principles: universality, territoriality, and a `middle ground' approach
Implementation of these Principles
Contents note continued: 8.The Elements of Coordination in International Corporate Insolvencies: What Cross-Border Bank Insolvency Can Learn from Corporate Insolvency
Background
The Model Law
Just a Bit of Theory and Policy
Corporate Groups
The Key Elements in the Growth of Cooperation
The Corporate Experience as it Relates to Banking
9.International Developments
International Initiatives: The IMF and the Basel Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group
The Uncitral Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
Concluding Observations
10.The Perimeter Issue: To What Extent Should Lex Specialis be Extended to Systemically Significant Financial Institutions? An Exit Strategy from Too Big to Fail
Too Big to Fail is Doubly Damned
Identifying SSFIs
Resolution
Regulation and Supervision
Other Measures to Deal with SSFIs
Non-bank SSFIs
Policing the Perimeter
Contents note continued: Systemic Risk and the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem
11.Ending Too Big to Fail: Practical Resolution Alternatives for Financial Conglomerates
Why Are Insolvency Rules Crucial?
Risky Business
Ending Too Big to Fail: Resolution Rules for Conglomerates
Necessity for Preparation and Coordination
Continuity for Functions, Not Firms
Corporate Structural Reform
Authorities' Operational Policies
12.Operational Issues
Planning in the Event of Firm Failure
Funding Runs: Deposits and Wholesale
Investment Firm Client Property
Counterparty Credit Risk Mitigation
Counterparty Credit Risk: Netting
Counterparty Credit Risk: Securities Collateral
Counterparty Credit Risk: Cleaving and Settlement
13.Bank Insolvency and Sovereign Insolvency
State Responsibility for Private Debt
The Collapse of the Creditanstalt in 1931
Iceland's Banking Crisis
Contents note continued: The Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises
Too Big to Fail: Bank Size and Sovereign Fiscal Capacity
The Fiscal Cost of Implicit Guarantees for the Financial Sector
14.Bank Insolvency Law in the United Kingdom
The Regulatory Background and Evolution from Northern Rock
Overview of the Banking Act
The SRR Objectives and the Treasury Code of Practice
SRR Stabilization Powers and General Conditions
SRR Stabilization Option 1 Transfer to a Private Sector Purchaser
SRR Stabilization Option 2 Transfer to a Bridge Bank
SRR Stabilization Option 3 Transfer to Temporary Public Ownership
Bank Insolvency
Bank Administration
SRR Safeguards
Recovery and Resolution Plans
15.US Bank Resolution Reform: Then and Again
Reforms to US Resolution Regime Following the S&L Crisis
Performance of the 1990s Reforms in the 2008 Financial Crisis
The New View of Systemic Risk and Prudential Regulation
Contents note continued: Resolution Reform in the USA
Reform for Troubled Institutions Then and Again
16.International Lessons from Lehman's' Failure: A Cross-Border No Man's Land
Overview
Regulatory Holes and Distant Early Warnings
Conclusion.
This timely book analyzes and discuss the various issues associated with cross-border bank insolvency following the financial crisis. Though financial markets and institutions have become international in recent years, regulation remains constrained by the domain of domestic jurisdictions. This dichotomy poses challenges for regulators and policy makers. If at the national level, bank crisis management is complex (with the involvement of several authorities and the interests of many stakeholders), this complexity is far greater in the case of cross-border bank crisis management, both at the EU level and at the international level.
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